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It is generally recognized that "trust" is an essential feature in business and even
more critically so in electronic commerce. In this paper we rst put "trust" (and re-
lated terms like deception and fraud) in context using a language/action perspective of
(electronic) commerce. We use the theory of Habermas to distinguish between commu-
nicative action and strategic action. In the second part of the paper, we describe various
ways in which fraud prevention and trust building can be implemented by means of a
mediating and monitoring broker. The central claim of the paper is that security is not
an add-on but part-and-parcel of "good" communication.
1 Introduction
From the start of the Internet, in the begin of the seventies, scientists have used this medium
to sustain research communities. Only in reent years, since commercial clients have been
allowed, this network, also called the Internet, has become available to the big public.
Whereas in the beginning, the network was used by the research community (universities,
institutions, etc.) that did mainly consist of a small group of people, these days the burgeons
of Cyberspace reside anonymously in dierent (types of) communities at the same time
(Spar and Bussgang, 1996). For instance a burgeon of Cyberspace can at one moment order
something at an electronic bookstore, and thereafter get some information about ORB's at
the OMG-website.
Trust plays an important role in everyday social interaction between subjects, and more
particularly electronic commerce transactions. For instance, if a customer orders a book at a
bookstore on the WWW, the supplier will, in case of any mistrust, hesitate whether he shall
actually send the book to the customer. Conversely, the customer may be reluctant to send
credit card information over the Internet. A situation may occur in which no commercial
transactions get a chance. And even when transactions do get a chance, the transaction
costs may rise because of the extra security measures that have to be taken (Williamson,
1985).
In this paper, we propose a broker architecture that enhances trustworthy transac-
tions. We take the Language/Action perspective as our paradigm. The Language/Action-
perspective focuses on the actions people perform while communicating. The foundation of
this perspective is laid by Austin (Austin, 1962) and Searle (Searle, 1969), who claim that
actions are performed on the basis of speech acts, e.g. language acts that form the most
elementary unit of communication between subjects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic con-
cepts of communicative action in order to build up a conceptual framework in which "trust"
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can be dened. Thereafter, we show the consequences of this framework for the security of
electronic commerce communication. In section 4 we apply the conceptual framework by
describing a broker architecture for trustworthy electronic commerce transactions and nish
with a conclusion.
2 Putting trust in context
The concept of trust has been studied in a variety of situations and scientic disciplines.
(Kini and Choobineh, 1998) provide a broad overview of the notion of "trust" in which they
distinguish three perspectives: (1) the approach of Personality Theorists - that focuses on
the tendency to trust of an individual, (2) the approach of sociologists - that focuses on
societal trust, trust that people have in social institutions, and (3) the approach of social
psychologists - that focuses on the role of trust in relationships. To these perspectives, we
could add an economic approach that analyzes the dynamics of trust using game-theory
(Nooteboom, 1996) or transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985). In this paper, we
want to take a communicative, or Language/Action approach, since communicative acts, be
it in the form of documents or EDI messages, or otherwise, are at the core of Electronic
Commerce transactions.
Models that are based on the L/A-perspective focus on the communicational structure of
a transaction, viewed as a communicative action. A communicative action can be dened as
`an interaction between subjects that engage in a social relationship' (Habermas, 1984). We
will develop the perspective by further elaborating on some of the core concepts associated
with communicative actions: sign, world, community.
2.1 Signs and deception
A communicative action is dened as an interaction between subjects, where this interaction
is linguistic: people perform illocutionary acts, with a certain eect in the social world, by
means of utterance acts, that is, using signs and combinations of signs. For example, by
uttering the word "John" (utterance act) a Speaker can refer (illocutionary act) to a John.
The relationship between the utterance act and illocutionary act is not a causal one but
is based on social conventions. As such, it is always possible to misuse it: to shout "fox!"
when there is no fox around. It is exactly by means of signs that subjects can deceive.
Umberto Eco expresses the same in his slogan: "In principle, semiotics is the discipline
studying whatever can be used for lying". Note, however, that the possibility to misuse the
sign is parasitic on the normal use of the convention. As such, deception does not challenge
the Gricean principles ("be relevant", "be cooperative", etc) but actually reinforces them.
If subjects would not be cooperative most of the time, and use the sign according to the
convention, the status of the convention would pass away and there would be no chance for
deception either.
Some may question the close connection between signs and deception by arguing that
one can also deceive another agent by just leaving the other in his ignorance or false beliefs.
However, in general one would not speak about deception in such a case. For example,
although I do not inform the people in China daily about my work progress, and hence leave
them ignorant, it is hard to call this a case of deception. The issue here is one of relevance.
When another agent yells in the dark: "Is anybody there?" and I keep silent, the silence
is indeed a form of deception, because as a communicative agent, I am expected to make
myself known, and I know the other party will interpret silence as a sign of no one being
there. So although the meaning of signs should always be considered in context (see also
below), we maintain that it is not possible to arrive at a meaningful notion of "deception"
if it does not involve communicative action.
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2.2 World
The L/A-perspective assumes that the actions that are performed by the subjects, take
place in a world or context. This context is both presumed by the communicative actions
and created by it.
In (Winograd and Flores, 1986), Winograd and Flores state that
`[K]nowledge and understanding ... arise from the individual's committed partic-
ipation in mutually oriented patterns of behavior that are embedded in a socially
shared background of concerns, actions, and beliefs. ... Through language ... we
create and give meaning to the world we live in and share with others'.
In other words, Winograd and Flores claim that we ourselves build up the (conception of)
world we live in by means of language.
Habermas introduces a more rened denition of a world; he states that through the
`communicative practice, they (the subjects) assure themselves at the same time of their
common life-relations, of an intersubjective shared lifeworld'.
As we have said above, the successful use of signs is dependent on the existence of social
conventions. These conventions do not exist out there in an objective way: they must be
supported by a community of subjects. However, these communication conventions are not
the only part of the lifeworld; this world includes also the shared concepts, beliefs, norms
etc that are needed for the right interpretation of the speech acts. It must be clear that
communication cannot be understood solely by studying the signs/messages in isolation,
but should always be considered in context. Linguists have expressed this by saying that a
message is more a kind of  that should be combined with the shared context to derive the
intended meaning (Clark, 1996)(Dik, 1989).
Thinking a bit further, it becomes clear that subjects do not live in one `world', but in
many worlds at the same time. We dened a world or domain as a `world that is made
up by the language actions we perform and denes the scope of the commitments and the
obligations that are made' (van den Heuvel and Weigand, 1997). For example, norms dier
from the organization I work in and the home I share with others; consequently, the speech
acts that I perform only make sense within the boundaries of the particular domain, e.g. the
organization. These world can be `natural' worlds, like countries and families or `articial
worlds', like the world that we create when playing a game, setting up an organization or
making a transaction on the Internet.
According to Habermas (Habermas, 1984) rationalization (as a historical process) en-
compasses dierentiation of the "world" in three aspects: the subject world, the object world
and the intersubject world. The subject world is the world of the beliefs, concerns and wishes
of one individual subject. The intersubject or social world supports the interaction between
multiple subjects and contains norms, obligations and social knowledge. The object world is
the world of objects and cause-event relations. For one thing, this dierentiation reminds us
that communication should not be reduced to one single dimension: for example, a logical
reduction to truth conditions, or a psychological reduction to "intentions".
2.3 Community
Communities are recognized as an important ingredient in developing lasting and fertile
(electronic) commercial relationships. A community can be dened as (Webster Dictionary):
 people living in the same district, city, etc. under the same laws;
 the district, city etc. where they live;




 ownership or participation in common;
 similarity; likeness: as, a community of spirit.
So, a community is characterized by a common background, or community of spirit, the
same laws, interests and living areas. In L/A terms, it is identical to the subjects sharing
a life-world. Because of the fact that the domains we are talking about in EC are articial
domains, we cannot identify physical borders of a community (or domain), like a country
border. Sometimes other means can be taken to demarcate the community, such as a domain
administrator (see section 3).
Besides physical communities, towards which the Webster Dictionary is oriented, we can
discern articial communities, for instance electronic communities in something that is called
Cyberspace. In (Armstrong and Hagel, 1996), Armstrong and Hagel identify four kinds of
electronic communities that meet consumer needs:
1. Communities of transaction
These communities support the actual negotiation between buyers and sellers, and oer
related services like information about the product. An example of such a community
is an electronic bookstore.
2. Communities of interest
These communities bring together subjects with the same interests. An example is
the Object Management Group.
3. Communities of fantasy
An example of such an environment is the MUD-environment, where participants can
pretend they are a certain hero, and build whole virtual, fantasy settings and story
lines.
4. Communities of relationships
These communities contain people that not only have tight relationships with each
other. Mostly, these relationships are based on a shared background, for instance the
members all had the same decease. An example of such a site is the Anonymous
Alcoholics Site.
Communities are developed and supported by communication, but this kind of commu-
nication is quite dierent from business transactions. The latter are by denition oriented
at some action, the delivery of a product or a payment etc. Communication to support
community building is not oriented at some particular action, but at sharing beliefs, values
and norms. In this way, the stock of shared knowledge can grow and a basis is laid for
communicative action as dened in the next subsection.
2.4 Communicative and Strategic Action
In this section, we investigate a taxonomy that has been developed by Habermas in his
theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984).
Communicative action is dened by Habermas as "action toward understanding (Ver-
standigung) as a way of coordinating the actions of the participants". Coordination is
achieved because the participants agree on certain beliefs and norms. Because of this agree-
ment, a request for action (for example) is eective when it is validated by the shared
knowledge. Or, to put it informally, the hearer accepts the request because he agrees with
the speaker that this is the right thing to do.
The result of a communicative action is dependent on the acceptance or rejection of a
validity claim. Habermas presents three dierent kinds of validity claims: truth, justice
and sincerity. These claims refer to subsequently the objective, social and intersubjective
world as we have seen these in section 2.2. The claim of truth refers to facts in the object
world. The claim of justice regards the adequacy of interpersonal relations, and the claim of
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sincerity entails the intentions of the speaker. These claims can be challenged; the agreement
is the theoretical endpoint of the discussions that can arise when a party raises a claim.
Besides communicative action, Habermas distinguishes strategic action. Communicative
action is oriented towards mutual agreement, whereas strategic action is aimed at attaining
individual goals. When acting strategically, parties interact because they think this serves
their own interests. So a hearer accepts a certain request because he thinks this will help
him in achieving some goal of his own (this can be a selsh but also an altruistic goal).
According to Habermas, communicative action and strategic action cannot be reduced to
one another. Moreover, he claims that it is not strategic action but communicative action
that achieves coordination in our lifeworld.
That opportunistic action, as presupposed in neoclassical economics, can lead to
inecient or even absurd results is nicely illustrated in a famous story told by the
Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen. Two strangers meet. "Where is the railway
station? he asks me. "There", I say, pointing at the post oce, "and would you
please post this letter for me on the way?". "Yes", he says, determined to open
the envelope and check whether it contains something valuable.
If we looker deeper in the taxonomy (g. 1), we see that Habermas makes a dierence
between two types of strategic actions: concealed strategic action and open strategic action.
Habermas speaks of open strategic action whenever the strategic character of the interaction
between the speaker and hearer is clear. In the case of concealed strategic action, the speaker
makes the hearer believe that all the presumptions for communicative action are satised.
If the speaker is deceiving himself, Habermas speaks of unconscious deception. Otherwise,
the speaker is willingly oriented towards his own success, and tries to manipulate the hearer.
Instead of opposing strategic action and communicative action, we propose to view them
as two dierent levels of social behaviour. Strategic action refers then to the economic
level at which agents are viewed as individuals maximizing some utility function, or, put
dierently, as pursuing certain goals, selsh or not. They pursue these goals by nding
subgoals and means that contribute to the satisfaction of the goals. In commerce, these
goals are typically related to prots of the company. Communicative action resides at the
social level at which subjects interact by means of language (section 2.1). In the same way
as communicative (illocutionary) acts are performed by means of utterance acts (signs),
strategic goals are pursued by means of communicative acts. Deception occurs when the
strategic goal expressed is not the real one. Assuming that goals are part of the subject
world of the communicative agent, deception is a case where the sincerity conditions are not
met. On the other hand, open strategic action occurs when the strategic goal is explicit. In
that case, there is no deception and no insincerity.
It may be objected that our proposal does not do justice to Habermas' extensive argu-
ment that coordination by means of strategic action is fundamentally dierent from coordi-
nation by means of communicative action. However, we still folllow Habermas in the claim
that communicative action cannot be reduced to strategic action and, more precisely, that
the coordination is eectuated by Verstandigung rather than by the two actors strategic
behaviour. Although the need for coordination may arise from the individual goals (but
not necessarily so), the coordination itself is achieved by communicative acts that have a
dierent orientation.
Habermas also makes a theoretical argument that ontologically speaking, strategic action
is grounded in communicative action. The thrust of his work is not that system worlds
focused on strategic action (such as "the market") should be abolished, but that these
system worlds should not colonize the lifeworlds. We interpret this in the present context
that electronic commerce should not be approached from a strategic action point of view
only, but its concrete applications should support ways of achieving mutual understanding
(Weigand and Dignum, 1997). These channels may be used as back-up facility only when
the system breaks down, but can also serve to support trust-building in the long run. An
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Social Action
come back on some concrete examples in section 4.2. Interestingly, it seems to be the case
in current (paper-based) international trade that most arrangements are made informally
by telephone and fax, and the papers only follow afterwards. If this is true, we should be
careful when replacing the paper-based procedure by electronic means not to ignore this
informal part.
2.5 Trust, fraud and deception
In this subsection, we will take a closer look at the relation between trust, fraud and decep-
tion, in order to come to a language/action-based denition of trust.
We say that an action is fraudulous whenever a subject tries to deceive another (group
of) subject(s) in order to gain an wrongful prot out of it, be witty at somebody else. Hence,
the major element of fraud is deception. In practice, deception often occurs by manipulating
documents in such a way that somebody believes (s)he has to do something (Bons, 1997).
Deception and fraud involve communication. Parties can cause various kinds of harm,
but deception can only be achieved by means of signs. Hence prevention of deception and
fraud is closely related with control measures at the level of communication
Trust has been dened as `a particular level of the subjective probability with which
an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action,
both before he can monitor such action (independently of his capacity ever to be able to
monitor it) and in a context in which it aects his own action" (Gambetta, 1985). Kini and
Choobineh have dened the concept of trust in the context of Electronic Commerce systems
as `an individual belief in the competence, dependability, and security of the system under
conditions of risk' (Kini and Choobineh, 1998). In terms of risk analysis, the hazard is the
existence of mala de parties, the peril is the occurrence of the deception and the exposure
are the objects or funds being lost to such parties. All three components can be taken as a
basis for prevention. The hazard can be reduced by dealing with trusted parties only (which
of course prompts the question how trust can be enabled); the peril can be reduced by
preventing deception (e.g. by using secure communication means), and the exposure can be
reduced by e.g. insurances, outsourcing, but also by the back-up availability of legal court.
This analysis also gives an indication of the relationship between trust and deception.
We have two additional remarks on the above denitions of trust. The rst is that
they describe trust as a cognitive disposition without taking into account where the trust
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is built on. In the context of Electronic Commerce, the existence of trust or distrust is less
interesting than the question how trust is enabled. This is what we would call the objective
dimension of trust.
The second remark is that the denitions ignore the social dimension. Trust is also a
relationship. People put trust in the other party, or in the agent that they hire, and in
the case of nonconformance, the trust is violated, and the relationship is jeopardized. This
is what we would call the social dimension of trust. An example in Electronic Commerce
relating to this dimension of trust is the value of brand names, but also the whole issue of
virtual organizations (see below).
We would like to summarize this discussion in a denition of trust from an L/A perspec-
tive. Let us rst dene a communicative agent as an agent that takes responsibility for the
communicative actions he is engaged in. As a Speaker, he takes responsibility for what he
says in terms of truth, sincerity and justice. This includes that he keeps up his promises.
As an Addressee, he takes responsibility for what he hears. This includes condentiality
and an interpretation of the contents of the message in accordance with the shared beliefs
and values. We can now dene trust to be (the level of) grounded expectation that the other
agent is acting communicatively. Note that this relationship may be symmetrical, but not
necessarily so.
This denition recaptures several important elements from the denitions given above
in an integrated form. For instance, it takes over the social dimension (because of its link to
communicative actions between agents), the objective dimension (by the word "grounded")
and the subjective dimension ("expectation"). In some sense, it is wider that the denition
of Gambetta since it is not necessarily oriented towards the future, and in some sense it is
more strict in that it does not apply in situations in which another agent may aect my
behavior without there having been any communication between us.
To account for the (derivative) use of the word "trust" to inanimate objects, we can take
over the denition of Kini and Choobineh. This notion of trust is supposedly metaphorically
derived from the primary one, but they cannot be merged: objects are not communicative
agents, nor can agents be reduced to objects. Note that in the context of Electronic Com-
merce, both notions of trust play and role and should be sharply distinguished: trust in the
other party and trust in the system (the Internet, the rewall etc). For Electronic Commerce
to be adopted, both forms of trust must be present.
3 Communication and Security
In the preceding sections, we have sketched a Language/Action based framework of com-
munication. In this section, we show what this means for securing trustworthy electronic
commerce.
In our framework, (electronic) commerce is doing business by means of speech acts. Secu-
rity measures can and should therefore apply both to the means and the ends, that is, both
the utterance acts (the physical level) and the illocutionary acts (the essential level). These
two levels correspond with what Bons calls the communication level and the business level,
respectively (Bons, 1997). These two levels of security are implementation-independent.
The communication security draws on the lower level, the channel level. This level serves to
secure the transport medium for the messages. The channel level is implementation-specic,
and can be realized by rewalls and encryption techniques. We talk about levels rather than
aspects because each level is enabling for the next-higher level.
Before going on to describe the possible measures at these levels, it is important to keep
in mind what the purpose of these measures is. Parties want to execute communicative
actions, that is, achieve eects in the social world(s), but they can only do that by making
another act in which they represent the action. The utterance act makes use of a medium,
either the medium of oral speech or the medium of paper-based text, or some digital medium.













Figure 2: Levels of Security
In addition to the levels distinguished by Bons, we include one highest level, the strategic
level, corresponding to the strategic goals that subjects achieve by communicative acts.
3.1 The channel level
The channel or network level is the most `primitive' level of security, since it only looks at
the transportation of messages as technical entities.
The channel security level services are hardware and/or software products that can be
bought on the market (COST - Commercial O The Shelf). They are enablers to trustworthy
communication. At the moment, the channel level is rather well-served, but there is still a
long way to go, especially with regards to the integration of dierent secure components,
which may introduce new insecurities. We refer to the relevant literature for an in-depth
discussion of these techniques.
3.2 The message level
We use the term "message level" as the equivalent of Bons's communication level; in L/A
terms, it is the level of the utterance acts, that is, the messages that are exchanged. Message
level security is concerned with the documentary security of the messages. Traditional





To these requirements that have been discussed already extensively in the security lit-
erature, we would like to add another group, namely, the level of context-independence. A
message is typically a partial representation of a speech act, and hence requires additional
context information for the interpretation. For example, it may be left implicit in a busi-
ness transaction which national law does apply in the case of noncompliance. Even if it is
unambiguous which law does apply in the context, the fact that it is not written down may
become a cause of conict and could be used by an opportunistic party to deceive the other
(cf. 2.1).
Hence, the quality can be said to increase when the context is made more explicit. In







Figure 3: Patterns of EC communication
process of decontextualization, since written text is designed to be conserved and transfered
to other contexts (in space or time).
Within the settings of Electronic Commerce, the context can be expressed at least in
terms of the time and place of sending and the eect of certain speech acts (which hinges on
the social world, the institutions and legal framework in which the transaction takes place).
In addition to these security requirements, other quality attributes can be dened as
well, for example, eciency and ease of processing. In practical situations, a trade-o has
to be made between dierent sometimes conicting requirements.
All the requirements stated so far pertain to the form of the message (the message level),
and are not related to what is achieved by the messages, the business transactions. So, we
still need a higher level of security, that looks at the what the business transactions do.
3.3 The speech act level
The speech act level of security is concerned with the type of information that has to be
exchanged in order to perform a secure transaction (Bons, 1997). As we have argued in
(Weigand and van den Heuvel, 1998), one can use patterns of speech acts to represent
electronic commerce transactions (see g. 3).
At the lowest level, we have dened individual speech acts represent one performative
act, like a request or a promise. Speech acts usually only have a meaning when they come in
pairs; for instance a request that is followed by a commit. We call these pairs of speech acts
a transaction. A transaction can be dened more formally as the smallest sequence of speech
acts that has an eect in the social world of the participants. These eects can be dened in
terms of obligations, authorizations and accomplishments. At a higher level, we have dened
a workow loop that can be constituted of dierent transactions. For instance a typical
workow loop can be built up from an actagenic and factagenic transaction, or conversation.
During the actagenic conversation an actor requests something from another actor, which
he can reject or accept. This leads to a commitment or obligation to keep the promise. The
factagenic conversation starts after the executor has performed the transaction, and (s)he
has declared that (s)he has created the desired state-of-aairs. The factagenic conversation
results in an obligation for the customer to accept the state-of-aairs, if it is conform the
conditions of satisfaction. The ActionWorkow-loop (Medina-Mora et al., 93) is an example
of such a workow loop (see g. 4); a related approach is known as DEMO (Dietz, 1992).







Figure 4: Workow Loop
takes the viewpoint of the buyer or the seller. Since business transaction are in fact ex-
change processes, we have dened contracts to represent this reciprocity. The contracts can
be represented as two interleaving workow loops: e.g. a customer that requests a product,
and a supplier that request money for it in return. Typically, parties make use of various
(implicit) contracts during a business transaction. The order of the contracts can be repre-
sented by means of scenario's. An example within the context of electronic commerce is an
identication contract, followed by one or more transactional contracts and closed by the
ending (writing out) of the relationship.
We want to emphasize that most of the general principles for inter-organizational controls
(cf. (Bons, 1997), p.60-62) are automatially fullled when communication (at the speech act
level) is set up properly. For example, when the Action-Workow loop approach is followed,
it is included that "if a primary activity is performed by Role1, Role 2 should testify the
completion thereof" (principle 1), since this is what happens in the factagenic conversation.
The fth principle in (Bons, 1997) about outsourcing can also be interpreted as a specic
application of the workow principle that an activity requires commitment of the executor
before he can and should do something. The other principles are summarized as: "before
a role executes an activity for which some counteractivity has to be performed by another
role, it should be certain about the performance of this counteractivity" (principle 2-4).
These principles say two things: (a) that activities must be reported back to the initiator
c.q. beneciary, and (b) that in the case of mistrust, the agent should postpone his own
action (the counteractivity) until he has received this report. The former follows in the L/A
perspective from the use of workow loops in which actagenic conversations must be followed
up by factagenic conversations. This latter is a requirement that species something about
when they must be made. This can be dealt with at the level of the contracts, where two
workows are synchronized. Secure contracts are contracts that guarantee the symmetry of
the exchange. Interestingly, this latter constraint is not dealt with in Action Workow or
DEMO, probably because these methods assume that there is trust (which is a reasonable
assumption within organizational settings, but not in the interorganizational context).
3.4 The strategic level
The previous levels have dealt with the prevention of deception: they specify which commu-
nicative acts should be made (speech act level) and how they must be made, i.e. the quality
of the signs (message level). It should be stressed that these measures are only eective
when there is a community in which the communication is embedded. This community can
be formed by the umbrella of law (and a system of law enforcement), or by the umbrella of
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a trusted third party or public institutions.
As explained in section 2.4, agents achieve strategic goals by means of communicative
actions. However, whereas communicative acts are visible in the utterance acts, the strategic
goals are set by each party itself, withis his own domain.
In the agent architecture of (Verharen, 1997), the communication is specied in
the form of transactions and contracts. These correspond to the communicative
actions, over several layes, described above. In addition, each agent has a task
structure which denes its goals. Whereas the communication is by necessity a
shared responsibility of the two agents, the strategy is a private responsibility.
The actions that are specied in the contracts, agreed upon by two or more
agents, provide the means for the agent to execute its tasks. However, the
contract also species the obligations that follow from a certain action. These
obligations together with the tasks of the agent determine its agenda.
The strategic level itself falls outside the scope of the communicative perspective, but
since it is enabled by communicative actions, communication is highly relevant also at this
layer.
Risk prevention at the strategy level involves the alignment of the dierent strategies of
the partners. The risk of opportunistic behaviour (the hazard) can be reduced by forming a
strategic alliance or virtual organization. This can be done directly, in a bilateral agreement,
or indirectly, by two or more bilateral agreements with a Trusted Third Party. Note that at
this point, communication comes in again, but not communication in the form of business
transactions, but communication about strategy alignment and community building.
4 The Trusted Broker
The main function of the trusted broker should be to facilitate the communication between
parties that want to engage in an electronic commerce transaction. However, without trust
between the parties the transaction costs can rise excessively.
This observation leads to the conclusion that the broker should be a trusted broker: e.g.
a party that provides a community in which the parties can be sure (to a certain level of
condence) that the counterparty will not show opportunistic behaviour.
4.1 Security provided by the Trusted Broker
The trusted broker must provide three levels of security: channel level, message level and
speech act level. As we have already indicated the channel level security solutions can be
bought on the hardware and software market. The message and speech act level however,
pose more problems. The security requirements, as dened in the above, can be fullled by
a trusted third party, that is an independent party that is specialized in providing business
condence, through commercial and technical security features. Examples of such services
are time-stamping, notary functions and the certication of digital signatures.
These message security issues are dealt with by the transaction, or accounting, module.
This module should monitor and register all communication between the parties involved.
The control information can be used to reduce the uncertainty about the performance of
the transaction(s).
In case of any problems, the parties can get access to this repository. Moreover, this
control module can check on the basis of the contract whether the transaction is acceptable.
The broker can deliver speech act level security through the provision of certied business
patterns as discussed in 3.3.
The architecture of the broker has been denoted in gure 5. As can be seen in this
picture, the broker needs a repository to store the identity of the subjects. The patterns







Figure 5: The Trusted Broker Architecture
`transaction monitor', or controller on the basis of the registry. The control information can
be used to reduce the uncertainty about the performance of the transaction(s).
4.2 Communicative action supported by the Trusted Broker
The early work on electronic commerce attaches great importance and signicance to tran-
sient relationships which support unique projects or in the context of electronic markets,
rapid switching between economic partners. However, as (Holland and Lockett, 1998) and
others argue, most virtual organizations (as they call all kinds of interorganizational rela-
tionships in general) do not follow this pattern but share instead more characteristics of
relatively stable market networks. Holland and Locket conclude that therefore trust will be
more important than issues of security and formal guarantees, and that in international re-
lationships, more emphasis will be placed on developing trust rather than security measures
(Aulah et al., 1996).
From the Language/Action perspective we have described in section 2, this development
certainly makes sense. Communication should always be viewed in the context of a lifeworld.
However, developing trust should be supported somehow. (Holland and Lockett, 1998)
hypothesize that shared information systems amongst economic partners will serve to speed
up the trust/distrust development process. The "shared information system" may be the
Trusted Broker as described in the previous section, but may also include the sharing of
knowledge in the form of developing a common vocabulary or developing common contracts
and scenarios (cf. section 4.3).
(Leiwo and Heikkuri, 1998) have discussed the use of ethics in open public communication
networks. They propose an ethical "layer" that describes certain rules of conduct, but in
contrast to other approaches, they argue that this ethical layer should be embedded in
a "social contract" layer. In other words, rst we must develop domains where subjects
can be allowed or not. By becoming a member of the domain ("the club"), the subjects
have to agree on some common ethical principles. Within a group, there must be room
for further ethics negotiation. Although we do not follow (Leiwo and Heikkuri, 1998) in all
details, we agree that domains must be supported (by the Trusted Broker), that subjects are
allowed to domains by a Domain Administrator who identies subjects (see also (van den
Heuvel and Weigand, 1997)). And within the domain, subjects can negotiate more and more
elaborated contracts and scenarios. Negotiation support can be an important added-value
of the Trusted Broker.
4.3 The dynamics of trust
Usually, trust is dealt with in a static fashion, that is, trust exists or does not exist, or
trust is enabled by certain measures or not. However, trust can evolve over time. For the
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measures that we take, we should also consider the eect of these measures on the trust
building process.
Let us start at the zero level in which there is no trust at all. In that case, business
transactions can only be performed by direct exchange or by the involvement of a trusted
third party. For international trade, direct exchange is not an option, unless we consider the
installation of local branches as a means to support this. When there is a minimal level of
trust, either by virtue of the trusted third party, or by the community environment, the level
of trust can be raised by the use of trustworthy trade procedures. Crucial for the further
development of trust is the experience acquired through repeated interaction.
To achieve a next higher level of trust, it is necessary to build up a common world, in
terms of knowledge, norms and values. It should be remarked that this requires dierent
types of communicative acts and probably much richer media (including non-verbal commu-
nication) to achieve this. At this point, trustworthy trade procedures, as they are used in
the previous stage, may become a hindrance. A control message may increase the security,
but at a meta-level (Bateson, 1972), it may be an expression of distrust ("I need this mes-
sage because I do not trust you"). Therefore, the parties may decide to skip some control
messages. However, it is also possible, and perhaps advisable, to keep the control messages
and agree on the fact that it is not a matter of trust or distrust but a matter of transparancy
that just decreases the probability of errors and unintended misunderstanding. The value of
transparancy must be compared with the costs of the control messages, which may be very
low in the case of automated processing.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have taken a Language/Action perspective on trust. The conceptual
framework of L/A gives us the opportunity to put the notion of "trust" in a wider context.
The central claim is that electronic commerce services, as any kind of information system,
must be developed on the basis of "good" communication design. This includes, among
others, that messages, or electronic documents, must not be studied in isolation, since they
only make sense, or have meaning, in a world constituted by communicating subjects.
In the near future, we will start an industrial project in which a Trusted Broker will be
developed. In this project, both the security measures as described in section 4.1 and the
communicative actions described in section 4.2 will be worked out and implemented in the
form of a prototype system.
Important open research questions concern the contents of the communication patterns.
These questions relate to the present research on institutions (Picot et al, 1997). Institutions,
whether in the form of a bilateral agreement or in the form of auctions or legal frameworks,
are ways to stabilize market interactions. Institutions can and should be analyzed from an
economic perspective - that is, how the goals of the partners are served, the eciency of the
process, the symmetry etc. - and from a communicative perspective, since communicative
action is the enabler.
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